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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Robert Scott Lippert appeals from the judgment of conviction entered 
upon the jury verdict finding him guilty of sex abuse of a child under the age of 
16. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
Lippert's adult daughter reported to the authorities that Lippert had 
sexually abused her when she was a teenager. (#33028 R., pp.10-11 .1) 
Following an investigation, the state arrested Lippert and charged him with sex 
abuse of a child under 16. (#33028 R., pp.10-11, 43.) The district court 
appointed the public defender to represent Lippert. (#33028 R., pp.32-34.) 
At a pre-trial hearing, Lippert expressed dissatisfaction with his attorney, 
and requested substitute counsel be appointed. (#33028 Tr., Vol. 11,2 p.18, L.13 -
p.20, L. 7.) Specifically, Lippert told the district court that he was dissatisfied with 
the lack of "substantial discussion" with his appointed counsel about his case, 
1 The Idaho Supreme Court ordered that the appellate record in this case be 
augmented with the clerk's records and transcripts filed in Lippert's prior appeal, 
State v. Lippert, Docket No. 33028. (3/6/11 Order.) 
2 The appellate record from Lippert's prior appeal, Docket No. 33028 contains 
two reporter's transcripts. Volume I contains transcripts of pre-trial hearings held 
on October 19, 2005, and the afternoon of November 16, 2005. (See #33028 
Tr., Vol. I.) Volume II contains transcripts of a pre-trial hearing held on the 
morning of November 16, 2005; pre-trial motion hearings of January 4th and 6th 
2006; the four-day jury trial from January 23-26, 2006; and the sentencing 
hearing from April 27, 2006. (See #33028 Tr., Vol. 11.) The state cites these 
transcripts as "Vol. I," and "Vol. II," respectively. The appellate record in the 
Lippert's current appeal, Docket No. 38613 contains only one transcript, from a 
September 15, 2008 motion hearing. (See Tr.) The state cites this transcript 
. -
simply as "Tr." 
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and that he did not agree with his counsel on how his case was to be handled. 
(Id.) Lippert's counsel told the court that he did not think the attorney-client 
relationship had broken down, but that he did not object to substitute counsel 
being appointed. (#33028 Tr., Vol. II, p.19, Ls.4-9.) The district court denied 
Lippert's request for substitute counsel. (#33028 Tr., Vol. II, p.20, L.8 - p.21, 
L.14.) 
On the scheduled day of trial, Lippert initially refused to leave his jail cell. 
(#33028 Tr., Vol. I, p.166, L.15 - p.169, L.18.) After the district court directed the 
jailors to bring Lippert to court (#33028 Tr., Vol. I, p.172, L.19 - p.173, L.1), 
Lippert explained that he had not been given notice of the trial date, that he had a 
severe headache, and that he was dissatisfied with his appointed counsel 
(#33028 Tr., Vol. I, p.174, L.5 - p.179, L.2). He also continuously asserted that 
he was unrepresented. (Id.) Eventually, the trial commenced with Lippert's 
participation. (See generally, #33028 Tr., Vol. I.) 
The jury found Lippert guilty of sex abuse of a child under 16. (#33028 R., 
pp.176-177.) Lippert's appointed attorney continued to represent him through 
sentencing, where the district court imposed a unified fifteen year sentence with 
six years fixed. (#33028 R., pp.184-185; #33028 Tr., Vol. II, p.479, L.5- p.547, 
L.18.) Lippert timely appealed. (#33028 R., pp.186-188.) 
On appeal, Lippert argued that the district court erred in admitting certain 
I.RE. 404(b) evidence of Lippert's prior sexual misconduct, and that the district 
court failed to conduct an adequate inquiry regarding Lippert's request for 
substitute counsel. See State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho 586, 181 P.3d 512 (Ct. App. 
2 
2007). The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed Lippert's conviction, holding that the 
probative value of the evidence of uncharged incidents of sexual misconduct was 
not outweighed by its prejudicial effect. & at _, 181 P.3d at 515-518. 
However, a majority of the Court also held that the district court failed to give 
Lippert a full and fair opportunity to present facts and reasons in support of his 
motion for substitute counsel. & at , 181 P.3d at 518-523. The Court 
remanded the case for a determination of whether Lippert had good cause for 
appointment of new counsel, and instructed the district court to grant Lippert a 
new trial if it found such good cause. & 
On remand, the district court conducted a hearing, and considered briefing 
and argument on the issue of Lippert's request for substitute counsel. (R., pp.20-
35; see generally, Tr.) Lippert (who was at this point represented by private 
counsel), and his formerly appointed trial counsel testified at the hearing. (Tr., 
p.8, L.14 - p.76, L.5.) In a memorandum opinion, the district court concluded 
that Lippert failed to show good cause for substitution of counsel, and denied 
Lippert's motion. (R., pp.36-52.) Lippert timely appealed. (R., pp.70-72.) 
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ISSUE 
Lippert states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to appoint 
substitute counsel to represent Mr. Lippert because a complete, 
irrevocable breakdown of communication between Mr. Lippert and 
his counsel existed? 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Lippert failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in 
denying his motion for substitute counsel? 
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ARGUMENT 
Lippert Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Denying His Motion For Substitute Counsel 
A. Introduction 
Lippert contends that the district court abused its discretion in denying his 
motion for substitute counsel. (See generally, Appellant's brief.) Specifically, 
Lippert contends that the district court abused its discretion in concluding that 
Lippert failed to show good cause in the form of a "complete, irrevocable 
breakdown of communication" with his appointed counsel.3 (Id.) A review of the 
record reveals that the district court considered the proper factors in considering 
Lippert's request and properly exercised its discretion in denying Lippert's 
motion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The decision whether to appoint substitute counsel for an indigent 
defendant lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. I.C. § 19-856; State v. 
3 Lippert also alleged, for the first time during the hearing on his motion for 
substitute counsel after remand from the Idaho Court of Appeals that there was 
an actual conflict between himself and his appointed counsel. (Tr., p.10, L.2 -
p.12, L.25.) Specifically, Lippert alleged that his aunt had retained and then fired 
his appointed counsel in a divorce proceeding in the late 1970s or early 1980s, 
and his appointed counsel had also previously represented an opposing party in 
a property dispute involving Lippert. (Id.) In response, Lippert's appointed 
counsel testified that he had never heard of Lippert's aunt and did not start 
practicing law until 1987, and that he could not recall ever representing an 
opposing party to Lippert in any property dispute. (Tr., p.51, L.7 - p.52, L.19.) 
The district court concluded that Lippert failed to show an actual conflict of 
interest. (R., pp.39-40.) While Lippert references his allegations of an actual 
conflict in his statement of facts in his Appellant's brief (Appellant's brief, pp.1-2), 
he does not allege on appeal that the district court erred in finding that no actual 
conflict existed. 
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Nath, 137 Idaho 712, 714-715, 52 P.3d 857, 859-860 (2002); State v. Clayton, 
100 Idaho 896, 897, 606 P.2d 1000, 1001 (1980). 
Credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony, and the 
inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all matters solely within the 
province of the district court. Peterson v. State, 139 Idaho 95, 97, 73 P.3d 108, 
110 (Ct. App. 2003). 
C. Lippert Failed To Show A "Complete, Irrevocable Breakdown Of 
Communication" With His Appointed Counsel 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,§ 13 
of the Idaho Constitution guarantee the right to counsel, though not necessarily 
the right to the attorney of one's choice. State v. Clark, 115 Idaho 1056, 1058, 
772 P.2d 263, 265 (Ct. App. 1989). While the Sixth Amendment guarantees 
counsel who "function[s] in the active role of an advocate," Entsminger v. Iowa, 
386 U.S. 748, 751 (1967), it does not guarantee a "meaningful relationship" 
between an accused and his counsel. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 12-15 
(1983). 
A trial court may, in its discretion, appoint a substitute attorney for an 
indigent defendant for "good cause." I.C. § 19-856; Clayton, 100 Idaho at 897, 
606 P.2d at 1001; State v. Peck, 130 Idaho 711, 713, 946 P.2d 1351, 1353 (Ct. 
App. 1997). Mere lack of confidence in otherwise competent counsel is not 
necessarily grounds for substitute counsel in the absence of extraordinary 
circumstances. State v. McCabe, 101 Idaho 727, 729, 620 P.2d 300, 302 (1980); 
Peck 130 Idaho at 713, 946 P.2d at 1353. Instead, "good cause" for the 
6 
appointment of substitute counsel generally requires either an actual conflict of 
interest; a complete, irrevocable breakdown of communication; or an 
irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently unjust verdict. Lippert, 145 
Idaho at_, 181 P.3d at 522-523 (citing Smith v. Lockhart, 923 F.2d 1314, 1320 
(8th Cir. 1991 ); McKee v. Harris, 649 F.2d 927, 931 (2 nd Cir. 1981 ); United States 
v. Lott, 310 F.3d 1231, 1250 (10th Cir. 2002)). The trial court must afford the 
defendant a full and far opportunity to present the facts and reasons in support of 
a motion for substitution of counsel having been made aware of the problems 
involved. Clayton, 100 Idaho at 898, 606 P.2d 1002. A court must also balance 
a defendant's choice of counsel against the "need for the efficient and effective 
administration of criminal justice." United States v. Weninger, 624 F .2d 163, 166 
(10th Cir. 1980). 
In Lott, a case cited in the Idaho Court of Appeals' opinion in this case, the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals set forth factors to be used in examining 
constitutional implications of a total breakdown in communication: "(1) whether 
the defendant's motion for new counsel was timely; (2) whether the trial court 
adequately inquired into defendant's reasons for making the motion; (3) whether 
the defendant-attorney conflict was so great that it led to a total lack of 
communication precluding an adequate defense; and (4) whether the defendant 
substantially and unreasonably contributed to the communication breakdown." 
Lippert, 145 Idaho at_, 181 P.3d at 523 (citing Lott, 310 F.2d at 1250); see also 
Romero v. Furlong, 215 F.3d 1107, 1113-1114 (10th Cir. 2000) (discussing the 
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four factors used to examine constitutional implications of lawyer/defendant 
communication breakdown relied upon in Lott). 
It is difficult for a defendant to show a "total breakdown in communication," 
whether or not a court specifically utilizes the Lott factors. See United States v. 
Hutchinson, 573 F.3d 1011, 1025 (10th Cir. 2009) (recognizing the "defendant's 
burden to meet [the Lott] standard," and holding that "without any evidence 
precluding the possibility of mere strategic disagreement or suggesting such a 
'total breakdown in communication,' we cannot say the district court abused its 
discretion in denying [the defendant's) motions."); United States v. John Doe #1, 
272 F.3d 116, 122-126 (2 nd Cir. 2001) (holding that a total breakdown in 
communication had not occurred when the defendant made threats of physical 
violence to his counsel and his counsel's family, and when he alleged that his 
defense counsel had repeatedly lied to him, because while the rift between 
defendant and counsel was "at times intense," defense counsel was able to carry 
out his duties and some communication did take place); LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 
F.3d 1253, 1276-1277 (9th Cir. 1998) (substitution of counsel not warranted 
where record showed counsel and defendant communicated, although defendant 
complained about inadequate time meeting with counsel and counsel's "gloomy 
predictions."). Such a high standard is necessary to prevent a defendant from 
paralyzing the criminal proceedings against him based on circumstances falling 
short of a Sixth Amendment right to counsel violation. 
Upon remand from the Idaho Court of Appeals, the district court 
recognized and applied the four factors from Lott. (R., pp.38-48.) The district 
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court then properly utilized its discretion in concluding that Lippert failed to show 
good cause for the substitution of appointed counsel. (R., pp.36-52.) 
First, the district court concluded that Lippert's request for substitute 
counsel, made on the morning of his jury trial, was timely. (R., p.38 n.3) The 
district court cited State v. Reber, 138 Idaho 275, 277, 61 P.3d 632, 634 (Ct. 
App. 2002), in which the Idaho Court of Appeals held that a motion for self-
representation was timely when it was made any time prior to the 
commencement of meaningful trial proceedings, including prior to the 
empanelment of a jury. (R., p.38, fn.3.) The state asserts that a motion for 
substitute counsel is not analogous to a motion for self-representation. On the 
contrary, a motion for substitute counsel that would necessitate a continuance if 
granted, such as a motion made for the first time on the day of trial, is not "timely" 
in a Lott analysis. See State v. Clark, 698 N.W.2d 173, 178 (Minn. 2005) 
(defendant's motion for substitute counsel made on the morning of trial, on the 
second day of jury voir dire, was untimely); U.S. ex rel. Guillen v. DeRobertis, 
580 F.Supp. 1551, 1554-1555 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (when defendant made request for 
new counsel on the day trial was to begin, and he had not indicated his 
dissatisfaction with counsel prior to that time, trial court did not abuse discretion 
in denying request, because it was likely motion was made to delay); U.S. v. 
Reyes-Bosque, 596 F.3d 1017, 1034-1035 (9th Cir. 2010) (regardless of when 
defendant makes motion for substitution of counsel, "the court must make a 
balancing determination, carefully weighing the resulting inconvenience and 
delay against the, defendant's important constitutional right to counsel of his 
9 
choice." (citations omitted)). However, in this case, Lippert initially requested 
substitute counsel at a pre-trial hearing approximately six weeks prior to the jury 
trial (#33028 Tr., Vol. II, p.18, L.13 - p.20, L.7).4 On the basis of that prior 
request, the state agrees with Lippert and the district court that his motion for 
substitute counsel was timely. 
Second, the district court adequately inquired into the grounds for Lippert's 
motion for substitute counsel by conducting a hearing specifically on that issue, 
and by considering briefing and argument from both parties before issuing a 
memorandum decision. (R., pp.20-52; see generally, Tr.) Lippert concedes on 
appeal, as he did below, that the district court's inquiry was adequate. (R., p.23, 
Appellant's brief, p.7.) Indeed, in gaining the opportunity to fully prepare for, 
testify at, and cross-examine his former appointed attorney at a dedicated 
hearing on his motion for substitute counsel, Lippert enjoyed more extensive 
protections than are required by the law in ordinary circumstances. Rios-Lopez 
v. State, 144 Idaho 340, 343-344, 160 P.3d 1275, 1278-1279 (Ct. App. 2007) (a 
district court is not required to conduct a hearing in order to afford a full and fair 
opportunity for a defendant to pursue his motion for substitute counsel). 
Third, the district court concluded that Lippert failed to provide evidence of 
a severe or pervasive conflict with his appointed counsel, or that he had such 
4 Though Lippert requested substitute counsel at both a November 16, 2005 pre-
trial hearing, and the morning of trial, the Idaho Court of Appeals, on remand, 
instructed the district court to consider only Lippert's request for counsel made on 
the morning of trial. (#33028 Tr., Vol. II p.18, L.13 - p.20, L.7; #33028 Tr., Vol. I, 
p.174, L.5 - p.179, L.2; Lippert at_, 181 P.3d at 518-523.) The district court 
recognized this instruction (R., p.2 n.1), but properly considered all of the 
circumstances of the criminal proceedings that led up to Lippert's final request for 
substitution of counsel (R., pp.36-52). 
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minimal contact with his counsel that meaningful communication was not 
possible. (R., pp.41-46.) While Lippert claimed that he wrote several 
unanswered notes to his appointed counsel in the months prior to the trial, and 
that his appointed counsel refused to communicate with him in preparing for trial 
(Tr., p.13, L.19 - p.14, L.3), Lippert's appointed counsel testified that he actually 
had significant communications with Lippert prior to the jury trial. At the hearing 
on Lippert's motion, Lippert's appointed counsel testified that he: visited Lippert in 
jail 13 times, discussed and agreed upon the disqualification of the initially 
assigned district court trial judge, spoke with Lippert prior to and after the 
preliminary hearing, provided Lippert with all of the discovery provided by the 
state, tracked down two out-of-state potential witnesses as requested by Lippert 
(but then elected not to subpoena those witnesses after Lippert told him they 
would lie at the jury trial), and discussed Lippert's right not to testify at trial. (Tr., 
p.54, L.19 - p.66, L.22.) 
A review of the record reveals Lippert's communications with his 
appointed counsel continued through the day before the jury trial and the trial 
itself. On the morning of trial, when the district court was trying to ascertain 
Lippert's position with regard to attending trial, Lippert's appointed counsel told 
the court that on the previous day he visited Lippert at jail and discussed the jury 
list, reviewed a transcript of a prior proceeding, and discussed what Lippert 
would wear at the trial. (#33028 Tr., Vol. I, p.166, L.21 - p.168, L.3.) At the jury 
trial itself, Lippert passed notes to his appointed counsel, and was able to 
engage in direct examination with him when Lippert testified in his own defense. 
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(Tr., p.64, Ls.21-23, p.75, L.14- p.76, L.3; #33028 Tr., Vol. I, p.343, L.9 - p.357, 
L.9.) While Lippert may have desired more personal contact with his appointed 
defense attorney, the existing communication fell far short of a "complete, 
irrevocable breakdown of communication." 
Fourth, the district court found that Lippert substantially contributed to the 
communication issues between rlimself and his appointed attorney. (R., pp.46-
48.) Lippert's appointed counsel testified that Lippert was uncooperative and 
difficult to deal with and would not discuss the case in details beyond affirmations 
of his innocence, and the expression of beliefs that the victim and other 
witnesses were lying. (Tr., p.62, Ls.14-18, p.66, Ls.19-22, p.72, L.1 - p.73, 
L.11.) The private counsel Lippert retained for the hearing on remand from the 
Idaho Court of Appeals acknowledged Lippert is "a little on the stubborn side." 
(R., p.24.) Having observed Lippert's obstructionist behavior firsthand, the 
district court noted that "[b]ased upon [its] own observations and the testimony 
provided at the recent hearing, [it] is not persuaded that the fault for a possible 
lack of communication should be laid squarely on appointed counsel alone, but 
that Mr. Lippert substantially contributed to any breakdown of communication by 
his own actions." (R, p.48.) 
On appeal, Lippert merely second-guesses the conclusion of the district 
court. (See generally, Appellant's brief.) He also repeats some complaints made 
below about his appointed counsel's performance (including allegations that his 
counsel was unprepared, had "alcohol on his breath" and that he could not "track 
in court") (Appellant's brief, pp.7-8; Tr., p.14, L.25-p.15, L.4, p.19, Ls.21-25), 
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that do not address the claimed breakdown in communication and would be more 
appropriately brought in a post-conviction ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim.5 
While Lippert's relationship with his appointed defense counsel was 
clearly somewhat rocky, he has failed to show that an irrevocable breakdown of 
communication occurred. Lippert has thus failed to show that the district court 
abused its discretion in denying his motion for substitute counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Lippert's judgment of 
conviction for sex abuse of a child under 16. 
DATED this 28th day of December 2011. 
MARK W. OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
5 As the Idaho Court of Appeals recognized, an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim is separate from a motion for substitute counsel, and Lippert is not 
precluded from making an ineffective assistance of counsel claim following the 
resolution of his direct appeal. Lippert, 145 Idaho at_ n.4, 181 P.3d at 523 n.4. 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 28th day of December 2011, served 
a true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a 
copy addressed to: 
DIANE M. WALKER 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
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MARK W. OLSON 
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